II. THE PUDGALA: ULTIMATELY REAL, SUBSTANTIAL, BOTH, OR NEITHER?
There are essentially three substantial sources available to us in attempting to reconstruct the view of the pudgalav!dins, and their reasoning behind it, in its earliest formulations. 10 Two of these, the first sections of the Kath!vatthu, and the ninth chapter (or appendix) to Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako%abh!&ya, are written by opponents of the pudgalav!da. Less substantial, but also falling into this category are Harivarman's Tattvasiddhi%!stra (or Satyasiddhi%!stra) , and the Sarv!stiv!din Vijñ!nak!ya (which is largely similar to the Therav!din Kath!vatthu, though less elaborate). 11 As hostile exegetes, we cannot be certain that they represent the pudgalav!da reliably, and these texts often present it elliptically. We cannot even be entirely certain that the view the Kath!vatthu argues against is same as the view Vasubandhu argues against -for apart from questions of misrepresentation, there is the possibility that the pudgalav!da itself developed and grew more sophisticated over time, in the face of critique.
12
Our third significant source for the pudgalav!da might be thought to operate as a check on such ambiguities, for they are the four texts written within schools espousing the pudgalav!da.
13
These are preserved only in Chinese translations, and unfortunately often have to do with the pudgalav!da only in parts; largely they concern other views held by these schools. 14 Of these four texts, the S!'mit#yanik!ya%!stra has the most useful material for reconstructing the claim that the person exists and the reasoning behind it.
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(James Duerlinger, Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) . 10 Although later Buddhist philosophers (including Candrak"rti, Bhavaviveka, )!ntarak&ita and Kamala*"la in his commentary on )!ntarak&ita) continued to engage with the pudgalav!da, my own discussion will remain with the earlier formulations of the view, and responses to it. 11 The Satyasiddhi%!stra is translated into English as Satyasiddhi%!stra of Harivarman, vol. II, English Translation by N. Aiyaswami Sastri. (Oriental Institute, Baroda 1978, 296) . There are several more minor sources, earlier as well as later; see Priestley's broad and detailed treatment of the pudgalav!da literature remaining to us (Pudgalav!da Buddhism, Chapter 2). 12 Priestley offers an account of how the pudgalav!da may have shifted over time (Pudgalav!da Buddhism, 71, (87) (88) . However, the specific change of position that he recommends -namely, from declaring the person 'not a substance', to declaring the person 'neither substance nor non-substance', to finally agreeing that their pudgala is, after all, a substance -is not, as will become clear below, one that I think did happen. 13 These are the S!nmíd (bù lùn (or Sa'mit#yanik!ya%!stra) , the Lü èrshíèr míngli)o lùn (or Vinayadv!vi'%ativyakti) , the S!nf)dù lùn and the Sì *hánmù ch!oji+. These are counted as three by Priestley, the last two evidently being translations of the same text, the Tridharmakha,-aka (or Tridharmaka%!stra, as Cha( u has it; the Chinese transliterations I am using are those used by Priestley, as are the reconstructed Sanskrit titles). These two translations diverge substantially, however, at certain points, so that one may actually get information in one not found in the other. Indeed, Priestley argues, 71, that " the disagreement between the S!nf)d. l.n and the S/ *hánm. ch!oji+ in their versions of the Tridharmakha,-aka's account of the second kind of conception is so extensive that the versions must surely represent different stages not only in the development of the text, but also in the elaboration of the doctrine which it presents." 14 Cha( u (The Literature of the Personalists of Early Buddhism) has detailed information about the history and content of these treatises in particular. 15 The S!'mit#yanik!ya%!stra has been translated into English by K. Venkataramanan, 'Sa#mit"ya-nik!ya-*!stra ', Visvabharati Annals 5 (1953) 153-243. what is said to be so'. it is unverified, accepted as given for the sake of convenience.
This insistence that the pudgala is ultimately real thus hints at one of the oldest epistemological-metaphysical distinctions in Buddhist philosophy, between that which is ultimately true or real (param!rthasat) and that which is conventionally true or real (sa'v1tisat). 21 There are different ways of cashing out this fundamental distinction between conventional and ultimate reality, and different interpretations of what those ways are. 22 But there are two principles which must be observed by any interpretation, and carefully balanced: First, there is no escaping that the distinction is a hierarchical division -'ultimate' is better than 'convention', more real, more true, more correct, accurate or precise. Second, and in tension with this, this hierarchy must be maintained without losing sight of the fact that conventional truth must nevertheless be true. One way to think of how these two principles might be jointly respected, without committing to one interpretation over the others is by appeal to the 'in virtue of' relation. That is to say, it is because ultimate reality is as it is that particular conventions are indeed correct or true; they are wellgrounded. 23 Conventional truths are true in virtue of how things stand ultimately, even when they do not actually describe or capture that ultimate reality accurately.
This distinction makes extremely minimal claims about the respective natures of ultimate and conventional reality, or criteria for determining into which class a candidate truth might fall.
There is primarily only the asymmetrical relation between them to tell the difference. Thus the much-used example of the chariot as a conventional, but not ultimate, reality:
It is because of the pole because of the axle, the wheels, the body of a chariot, the flag-staff of a chariot, the yoke, the reins, and because of the goad that 'chariot' exists as a 21 See Priestley, Pudgalav!da Buddhism 84, for the antiquity of this distinction, particularly relative to the familiar distinction between substantial and conceptual reality, discussed below. 22 Vasubandhu's account of sa2v1tisat as opposed to param!rthasat at AK6.4 is well known (that which remains after analysis, even mental analysis, is param!rthasat; what does not resist analysis is sa2v1tisat); Dharmak"rti (PV 2.3, 3. 3) makes the distinction according to whether or not something is capable of causal influence. For Candrak"rti's definition, see Prasannapad! 24.8; for )!ntideva's, see Bodhicary!vat!ra 9.2. For general discussion, see Mervyn Sprung ed., The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Ved!nta (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973) . 23 This would be respected by, for instance, Vasubandhu's definition. 'Being useful' plays a significant role in Mark Siderits' account of what makes a conventional truth well-grounded, but the structural point is essentially the same: "standing behind every conventionally true statement is some (much longer) ultimately true statement that explains why accepting the conventionally true statement leads to successful practice" (Buddhism as Philosophy, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 2007) 58; emphasis mine). Compare also, 62: "for every statement that is conventionally true, there is some (much longer) ultimately true statement that explains why it works." Presumably ultimate reality does not actually explain why 'it works' or is useful, but rather describes how things ultimately are such at, given certain ends, such conceptions will be useful. I return to this below. 1996) 27. The example is drawn originally from SN I.135, the verses of the bhikkhun" Vajir! to M!ra, to which Nagasena goes on to refer. 25 I will not try to argue for one interpretation rather another of prajñapti and prajñaptisat. It has to do with conceiving and mental activity; but see important arguments by Ganeri for why we should not take it to mean 'nominal', or assume automatically that 'conceptually real' means illusory or fictitious. However, when contrasted with substantial reality it is inferior, as conventional is inferior to ultimate reality. 26 See Paul Williams here on the equivalence, 'On the Abhidharma Ontology', 237 (Journal of Indian Philosophy 9 (1981): 227-57). See also Priestley, "The 'true and ultimate' seems to be what is later defined as the substantial (dravya) in contrast to the conceptual entity (prajñapti)" (Pudgalav!da Buddhism 94). 27 Though one might wonder whether all conceptual truths are thereby merely conventional, and not ultimate truths: If reality is intelligibly structured, as Plato, Aristotle or the Ny!yaikas held, then some concepts could get it right and so be ultimately true -not merely convenient conventions. 28 See, e.g., Paul Williams, 'On the Abhidharma Ontology', JIP 1981. I shall have more to say about the translation of dravyasat as 'substantial reality' below. Briefly, in philosophy, substance does duty as 'individuator', 'essence', 'that which underlies' and 'that which persists through change'. The Buddhist 'ultimately realities' will not turn out to play this lattermost role -nothing does; but as the first three familiar senses of substance are relevant to that which is dravyasat, I have chosen to stick with this familiar term of art, for this I believe is where the discussion is to be properly located. 29 Paul Williams describes the situation thus: "The secondary existent is dependent upon mental and linguistic construction, synthesis out of more fundamental and indubitable elements. These primary existents, on the other hand, are those elements which make up the synthesised existents and therefore cannot themselves have the sort of dependence which the latter enjoy.... A primary existent is primary and thus independent because it is the basis upon which rests secondary existents such as most of the objects of our everyday world." ('On the Abhidharma Ontology', 240). 30 M!dhyamikas excepted the conceptions derived based on those have a similarly derivative existence -insofar as they are real, it is in virtue of the reality of the substances on the basis of which they are conceived. In this respect, the choice to render these ultimate realities by 'substance' is deliberate: they are that which underlie phenomena as we experience them, and thus that which grounds or justifies those experiences. But this, note, goes one step further than the original distinction, appealed to by Buddhaghosa, between ultimate and conventional reality.
One important consequence of assimilation of substantial to ultimate reality is that qualities, for instance -conceived as modifications of substances -are not really real. Quantity, position, relation and all the other ways in which substances might be disposed, taken singly or in combination, are not real. 31 Either these experienced phenomena are themselves substances -in the minimal sense of independently specifiable individuals 32 -or else the experience of them must be explained in some other way, via the imposition of our mental activity onto the really existing substances. The Abhidharmikas, that is to say, stoutly reject any categorial schema. 33 Substances themselves may come in different kinds of course, but it would be wrong to say that they differ from one another in their qualities, for this would imply a substance distinct from its qualities, and in which the qualities inhere -and this is precisely the sort of metaphysical picture that is rejected.
It may be more correct to say that each substance, each ultimately existing individual, simply is the quality or factor which differentiates it from others. 31 One is tempted to call such a conception of being 'impoverished' but for the determination and tenacity required to maintain it. 32 Whether conceived of as colour tropes, pain tropes (cf. Ganeri, Philosphy in Classical India, Ch. 4), or in some other way; the Buddhists call them dharmas. The Abhidharma canon in fact has an entire treatise on 'conditional relations' (paccaya), the exhaustive Pa00!na. What becomes clear is that conceiving a paccaya as a dhamma amounts to making relations into discrete individuals, just like every other dhamma. While such a dhamma might 'link' two other dhammas, its doing so involves no alteration to its specific character, or to that of the 'linked' dhammas -we have simply a series of dhammas. It is no wonder that later Buddhist philosophers asked when such a dhamma was supposed to arise (with the previous or the subsequent dhamma in a series, if they are temporally related); and that much later Prabh!candra, commenting on Dharmak"rti's On Relations, says: "In the presence of something, something comes into existence and in the absence of that it does not come into existence... If this is so, then let those very two aspects (bh!v!bh!va) be taken as the cause-andeffect relationship; what is the need of postulating an unreal relation?" (The comment is on k!rik! 11-12 of Dharmak"rti's Sambandha-par#k&a, "If (you say that) cause-and-effect relationship is the relation which is of the nature of anvaya-vyatireka (i.e. in the presence of a cause an effect is seen and in the absence of it no effect is seen), then why not the same two (bh!v!bh!va i.e. anvayavyatireka) be taken as the cause-and-effect relationship?", must be either identical with the substantial entities known to exist (in which case their claim collapses), or it must be utterly distinct and distinguishable from those, and so be a substantial, independent individual in its own right (the unacceptable 'eternalist' position). 35 If it is neither the same nor different, then it cannot be a substance at all -and this, in their view, is tantamount to acknowledging that it is not ultimately real.
II.ii. … but not in the way of a substance
This final move is the one the Pudgalav!din resists. The person admittedly is not a substance; nevertheless, we cannot therefore conclude that the person does not exist ultimately.
The pudgala might be really real, but 'not in the way that (other) real and ultimate things are' (Kath!vatthu I.i.1) . By insisting that the person is ultimately real, the Pudgalav!din wants to reject the standard Abhidharma view that the person is merely prajñaptisat -a conceptual or conventional reality, whose reality is a borrowed one, grounded on the ultimate reality of its constituent parts.
36
But they want to do this without rejecting the Abhidharma metaphysical framework altogether -so that, while their position does not seem an unreasonable or especially complicated one, it turns out to be an incredibly difficult position to articulate. 38 I suspect that missing this challenge -that is, assuming the Pudgalav!dins agree that 'substantial' and 'conceptual' are exhaustive options -explains why Cha( u, for instance, credits the Pudgalav!dins with the view that the person is simply a conventional or conceptual reality; their denial that the self is a substance is taken immediately for the assertion that it is both conceptual, and not ultimate. Priestley also assumes the Pudgalav!dins accept the exhaustiveness of the substantial-conceptual distinction: "Either their belief was that the pudgala could be indeterminate and yet substantial, or else they held it to be conceptual and yet 'true and ultimate'" (Pudgalav!da Buddhism, 84); but of course there is a third option, namely, that the self is ultimate but not substantial. See also Duerlinger, Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons, 132. 39 According to Vasubandhu, the Pudgalav!dins hold that "a person is not substantially real or real by way of conception" (AKB §2.1.1, tr. Duerlinger; AKB 9; DS ed. 1192.7 "it exists neither as substantial nor as conceptual", [naiva hi dravyato-sti, n!pi prajñaptata3]). Priestley does not so much ignore this possibility as find it frankly unintelligible: "Certainly the V!ts"putr"ya's contention that the pudgala is neither conceptual nor substantial seems absurd" (Pudgalav!da Buddhism, 99); like Williams, he is persuaded of the fundamentals of Abhidharma ontology.
the correct account of that concept will not follow the manner of other constructed concepts. In the ordinary case, a conceptual reality is grounded on its constituent elements, and borrows its reality exclusively from them, from the efficacy of using them, or both. These constituents are all different from each other, different from the reality conceived, and they are ultimately real. In the case of the person, however, conceiving it is grounded not just on constituent elements, but on some other ultimate reality (call it the 'person') as well. It is in virtue of eyes, hands, volitions, cognitions, and the pudgala that one correctly conceives of 'a person'. Since the challenge is to the exhaustiveness of the dravyasat-prajñaptisat distinction, or -to put the same thing another way -to the assimilation of param!rthasat and dravyasat, it is no surprise that in the Kath!vatthu these two different ways of formulating the pudgalav!da should come to the same: (1) The person is found as ultimately real, but not in the way other ultimate realities are; 40 and (2) although there is indeed a conceptual reality to the 'person', the story of its reality is not the same as that given for other conceptual realities.
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My suggestion is this: It was the attempt to assert the ultimate reality of something not a substance, without dropping the basic non-categorial schema, that drove the Pudgalav!dins to express themselves in the neither-nor language for which they were viciously mocked. And it was the attempt to articulate a kind of reality for which there is no space within the metaphysical framework which drives the Pudgalav!dins to assert that the person is avaktavya, literally 'not to be said ', or ineffable, inexplicable. 42 For what it positively is, is literally -without abandoning the framework entirely -unsayable. And yet it is from within the framework that the need to posit some such reality is felt to arise. Unfortunately, both the 'neither-nor' language, and the avaktavya claim make it difficult to determine what exactly their position was, and more importantly, why they held it. In our efforts at what must then be a bit of philosophical imaginative reconstruction, we will discover that both the 'what' and the 'why' mutually illuminate each other: as we uncover what the person is, so will the reasons for insisting upon its reality become clearer.
III. WHAT IS THE PUDGALA, AND WHAT IS IT FOR?
What is the problem that positing a really existing person is supposed to solve? Why insist it really exists? And how is it not a substance?
40 KV I.1.1 41 KV I.1.171-192 42 Duerlinger (61n29, 66n66) strongly favours 'inexplicable' over 'ineffable', rejecting the common view that the Pudgalav!dins are claiming that the person cannot be spoken of or conceived. But of course one can say a lot, especially negatively, about something, without having the vocabulary or conceptual means of articulating what something is. I think it is this latter inability which leads the Pudgalav!dins to say of the person that it is avaktavya. Duerlinger's objection to 'ineffable' -which, incidentally, shares its construction with avaktavya -stems from his insistence that the best formulation of the pudgalav!da is in terms of the person as a conceptual reality, which its 'inconceivability' would seem to preclude.
III.i. Unity With, and Without, Selves
The substantial-self hypothesis of Brahmanical thought serves three philosophical functions: it provides a subject (enjoyer), an agent, and a unifier. 43 The Self -the substantially existing individual, distinct from the transient physical and psychological events in a life -is that which has experiences, initiates action, and that in virtue of which temporally, numerically and modally distinct experiences can belong to, or be parts of, the same whole. These phenomena of cross-modal unity and unity over time, and these logical principles of experience (agency and subjectivity) are what the Buddhist who wants to dispense with self must explain in some other way.
44
Of these outstanding explanatory tasks, the Pudgalav!din is primarily concerned with problems of unity in multiplicity, and questions of individuation that attend them. 45 This is not a new observation -those scholars who have concerned themselves with the pudgalav!da have generally observed that the central concern is something to do with unity. 46 We witness this interest in complex unity -that is, unity-in-multiplicity -in the Pudgalavadins' three ways of designating the person: namely, on the basis of the aggregates, on the basis of transition, and on the basis of cessation. 47 It is important to be clear that these are grounds for designating a group of elements as a pudgala; 48 although the pudgala is not without them, they are not what the pudgala is. In marking these out as the territory of concern, the Pudgalav!dins are clearly interested in the unity consisting of constituent substances of an individual at a time (aggregates), and with the continuity and the distinctness of continua over time (transmigration and cessation); that is to say, with individuation -which becomes especially clear in designating the person based on cessation, where questions of unity-in-multiplicity cannot arise, though continuity and individuation of continua can.
In the matter of the person, or self, the Pudgalav!dins are thus positioning themselves as a third alternative -neither Brahmanical, nor Abhidharmika. As is the way in such Buddhist debates, this will be articulated as the middle and moderate position between two unacceptable extremes - 45 Priestley also finds concerns with agency and subjectivity; but these may well be closely related to the more prominent interest in unity. 46 Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, [126] [127] [128] Cha( u, Literature of the Personalists, 161 47 See especially the Sa'mit#tyanik!ya%!tra for the three bases of the pudgala. The Tridharmakha,-aka does not use the word 'transition' to describe the second basis, but both versions we have do point to unity over time, whether indicating just the past (S!nf)dù lùn), or bringing in both past and future (Sì *hánmù ch!oji+). 48 Or, in the case of cessation, that there has been a person and whether that person exists or not is now indeterminate.
between the eternalism of Brahamanical thinking, which takes self to be an independently existing unity, and (on the other hand) the inadvertent nihilism of the other Abhidharma Buddhists, who have done away with a really existing self altogether.
49
Naturally, the non-Pudgalav!din Buddhists see it otherwise. They present their own position as the middle between extremes -casting the Pudgalav!dins as inadvertent eternalists -by acknowledging the conceptual reality of the self (thus, avoiding nihilism), while denying its substantial reality. 50 The self is, then, like every other purported complex whole -a supposed unity projected by the conceiving mind onto a multitude of really existing discrete substances. While there is basis in ultimate reality for each of the constituents, there is no basis in ultimate reality for considering that there is some one thing there; for ultimately, they are not one, but many. 51 The convention that there is one thing here will be true, but only derivatively, in virtue of the reality of the constituents thus conceived.
Were the unity itself, as such, to have some basis in ultimate reality, the story goes, then this basis would have to be some new thing, distinct and existing separately from the other constituents. This is a consequence of the non-categorial metaphysics which recognizes no 'modes' of being. 52 Something existing in this way would of course be a substantial individual, on a par with its constituent substances. Such substantial unities in the case of individual living beings are Selves.
The Brahmanical philosopher readily objects that this Buddhist non-self view cannot account for various experiences of unity -e.g., complex perception, memory, desire. If experiences 49 In this early period N!g!rjuna and his followers were often taken by Buddhists to have fallen into the nihilistic extreme -and Vasubandhu, for instance, does not waste many words saying so (AKB §3.10, Duerlinger translation). 50 See Harivarman as a representative spokesman of this view: "To say that the soul exists in the ultimate sense is satk!yad1&0i, and to say that the soul does not exist in the empirical sense is the wrong view, mithy!-d1&0i. But it is right view (samyak-d1&0i) when we say that the soul exists empirically and does not however exist ultimately... Thus is to be understood the statement that soul exists and that it does not exist. Why won't appeal to the principle of convenience and efficacy governing concept formation suffice to individuate persons? 60 There are, I think, two reasons. The first is that making judgements of convenience relies on two factors, both of which are problematic in the case of persons. The first factor is purposes: It is only convenient or efficacious to group aggregates one way rather than another provided we have some ends for which so grouping them is useful. The King wants to be able to get to his meeting with Nagasena, and in general wants to be able to get to various places quickly and comfortably. And so it is convenient to think of a certain aggregation of elements as 'a chariot'. But such ends are themselves constructed, arising only within conceptual reality. Conventional reality is thus presumed in making judgements of convenience. But this conventional reality is populated with persons, above all oneself -it is by thinking of Nagasena as 'whole' that King Milinda is able to conceive a desire to see him, and it is by presuming himself 'the same person' at the beginning and end of any journey that the King might conceive a desire to go anywhere. The circularity seems to be this: It is only convenient to grasp a group of aggregates together as a person given some ends; and these ends are conceivable in the first place only by 58 I think this gets at Paul Williams' objection (Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhic!ravat!ra: Altruism and Reality. First Indian Edition, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 2000 (First published Britain 1998)). Essentially the same objection is made to Parfit's attempt to do without any mechanism for stream-individuation (see discussion in Ganeri, Concealed Art of the Soul, 187). Siderits offers difference in quantity in place of difference in quality, and proposes to meet the objection in terms of 'maximal causal connectedness', and an appeal to consequentialism (Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy, (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) . One peculiarity of such a defense is that, to the extent that it succeeds, it undermines any motive we might have had to abandon notions of the self, or to suppose that it was holding these very notions which led inevitably to suffering. The second factor on which judgements of convenience rely is that ultimate reality be such that constructing concepts this way rather than that way is effective. 63 If, however, the appeal to efficacy is circular, and so empty, in the case of persons, then this element of a supposed judgement of convenience becomes simply an appeal to how things ultimately are, namely these dharmas really are, in some important sense, related exclusively to each other -and not to other dharmas with which they causally interact. 64 But this just is the pudgalav!da.
A second consideration making appeals to convenience inadequate is similar to the problematic presumption of persons in order to have (most) ends at all. Given our shifting concerns, it seems likely that different attributions of belonging would be more convenient under different circumstances. Gathering one subset together as 'the person' may be convenient under some circumstances, which grouping aggregates differently is convenient under other circumstances, or for other ends. What the Abhidharma Buddhist has not explained is how, if persons are purely 'convenient designators', they remain the same throughout changes in ends and purposes. If, however, it is overall convenient to have conceptual unities that do not so shift their boundaries, then this brings us swiftly to the deeper question of appeals to global unity, and the entitlement or conditions for making such an appeal. I will address this in section IV.ii.(b).
The Ny!ya-Vai*e&ika opponent might think that the only way to explain this is to posit the real existence of two distinct individuals -Devadatta and Yajñadatta -to whom some but not other experiences belong. This is where the Pudgalav!dins want to stake their middle ground. They are alert to the fact that the ultra-minimalist Buddhist view inevitably presumes the individuation of person-constituting-aggregates and person-constituting streams. 65 The view must be able to 61 Siderits suggests addressing this part of the objection by appeal to consequentialist principles, arguing that at least one end can be impersonally conceived (Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy, Ch. 3). It seems the point is that there is some impersonal end, reduction of suffering, best attained by conceiving of ourselves as persons with local aims and projects. I'm not sure this solution works. 62 Siderits seems to acknowledge this difficulty (Buddhism as Philosophy, 83). The end which he proposes, with respect to which conceiving of aggregates as persons is convenient, is 'reducing suffering'; but it is precisely for this quite general end that it is uncertain whether thinking in terms of persons is a help or a positive hindrance. 63 Compare Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, 75: "As N!gasena said, the conventional truth is that we are persons. This is conventionally true because it is ultimately true that these present skandhas are the cause of the future skandhas in this series." 64 "Might this not explain why we conveniently designate the one series as 'me' and the other as 'you'?" Siderits asks (Buddhism as Philosophy,83). "Might this not be the ultimate truth that makes it conventionally true that we are distinct person?" 65 Note the regularity with which reductionist responses to concerns about continuity, the sameness of the person over time, presume that we have already individuated a distinct causal stream.
discriminate between distinct persons -particularly, as we will discuss below, in order to articulate the phenomena of perception and karma; and it can only do so by in practice recognizing that some elements and streams belong together, and not to others. 66 But the Pudgalav!dins want to grant the metaphysically most minimal claim possible; so they will insist on the reality of 'belonging to', but without supposing the separate existence of someone or some thing to whom these elements belong. 67 They belong to each other, not to some further substance.
III.iii. Pudgala-Unity
Such a view recognizes that individuation of causal continua is presupposed, not projected.
That some elements belong to each other, and not to any others, is really, ultimately true. 68 This would mean that we are correct -getting rightly at the way things ultimately are -in regarding just these and not other constituents together, as being bound to one another in a way they are not bound to other ultimately real elements. But it is not so in the way that other ultimate truths are,
for it is not a substance; it is not an individual with a separate, distinct identity of its own. 69 The basis for regarding these aggregates as a person is not just the aggregates, but more precisely 'the fact that these elements are thus-and-so disposed with respect to one another'. . But of course, with their belief in reincarnation -that 'the same' causal stream extends through several different bodies and types of body -such a strategy, even if it works in principle, is not available to the Buddhist. 67 Because this introduces no 'separately existing entities ' (Reasons and Persons, 275) , and yet also insists on the reality of this fact of belonging together -which might consist in the aggregates being thus and so disposed (if you had to point to where it happens), but which goes beyond the mere recognition of the existence of each individual element -I am not certain whether this view should be considered reductionist on Parfit's terms, or as a variant of the 'further fact view' (Reasons and Persons, 210). I am tempted to think that the reductionist/non-reductionist positions as Parfit describes them -with the 'further fact view' falling among the non-reductionists (e.g. Reasons and Persons, 279) -are not the exclusive and exhaustive options he supposes (Reasons and Persons, 216, 273: "a fundamental choice between two views"). At any rate, for what it is worth, if reductionists, then the Pudgalav!dins are of the sort that accept Parfit's theses (3) and (5), but not (4), the person is its constituents, or (9) a complete description of reality could be impersonal (Reasons and Persons, (211) (212) . 68 So we should be cautious about describing the Pudgalav!din's view as that the "pudgala something more than the reunion of its constituents..." as, for instance, Cha( u does (Literature of the Personalists, 161). 69 Thus I think Duerlinger is correct in describing the pudgalav!da view as asserting that 'persons' do not have identity of their own. His account, however, leaves it unclear why they would assert such a thing, or what they might mean by it. 70 "We, however, plead that the five aggregates put together form the soul" (Satyasiddhi%!stra, tr. Sastri, 70; emphasis mine). Against this we must set a remark from Sns: "Now we say, where (the Buddha) has spoken (of it to) the Sr!vakas he has done so (only) as based on the elements, that is all. There is no other self… Now we say, the Buddha said that the person exists as conditionally cognized. Therefore that which is (here referred to) is only the (objective) counterpart of this (cognition) and not any real self" (177 of Ventakaramanan's translation). Since the Sa#m"t"yas have just asserted that "that the self exists etc. can be said" (175), we might suppose that these arguments (on page 177) are aimed at those who mean by asserting the real existence of the self to assert the separate existence of a distinct individual, something the Sa#m"t"yas, and all Thus we have two reasons why the pudgala will not conform even to the very early, canonical Abhidharma notion of a relation: First, the pudgala is not a single dyadic relation between two individuals, nor could it be conceived as a series of such relations without missing the point; second, the pudgala is not an isolatable, distinct individual with its own unchanging identity, as the paccayas are meant to be. Without simply being the aggregated elements (for the pudgala is rather the fact of their belonging together, not to others, and not others to them), still it is not different from or separable from these. 71 So far from excluding other substances (as one substance excludes another), 'persons' so understood would in fact have their particular identities determined by their constituent substances. Indeed, we can see that the pudgala described here would even necessarily reflect the particular nature and qualities of different elements taken together. … a fire is reckoned by the particular condition dependent on which it burns -when fire burns dependent on logs, it is reckoned as a log fire; when fire burns dependent on faggots, it is reckoned as a faggot fire; when fire burns dependent on grass, it is reckoned as a grass fire; when fire burns dependent on cowdung, it is reckoned as a cowdung fire… 75 Different fires are distinguished in kind and named according to their kind of fuel. That this is the correct way of distinguishing fires suggests a particularly close relation between fuel and fire, without identifying them. It is precisely by not being able to exist separately from the fuel that the fire is rightly named according to its fuel, without being identified with that fuel. So similarly with the person: Without being identical to the aggregates, it borrows its qualities from them.
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This point will hold just as much for complex unity at a time, 77 as for unity through change over time. 78 Just as it is ultimately true that these aggregates belong together, so is it ultimately true that some elements existing at different times genuinely belong to one another, and not with others. This is why the Pudgalav!dins argue that to deny the sant!nin, 'possessor of continuity'
would indeed be to deny continuity (sant!na). 79 This need not be a rehash of the Ny!ya-Vai*e&ika claim that there are no experiences without an experiencer -indeed, there is reason to think that the Pudgalav!din would reject such a claim. 80 If the sant!nin, 'possessor of continuity', is the pudgala, and the pudgala is just is the fact that these and not other aggregates are connected to each other as they are not to others, then denying the pudgala will indeed be tantamount to denying continuity. 78 the person designated by way of transmigration, whose primary concern is with karma, with the appropriateness of morally inflected causes and consequences. This focus on karma may be significant, and will be discussed below. 79 Though perhaps not in the way Châu intended it: "The specific relationship between the pudgala and the supports is explained by the continuity of a single individual independent of others. There is continuity (sant!na), there is therefore a possessor of continuity (sant!nin). According to the Pudgalav!dins, to deny the possessor of continuity is to deny continuity." (Literature of the Personalists 161) 80 The experiencer or subject of experiences, and the agent of action are two traditional roles of 'self' that the Pudgalav!din does not seem especially concerned to revive. Note, for example, that they deny that the pudgala is the experiencer of pleasure, according to KV I.i.154; and further, the fruit and the experiencer of the fruit cannot be said to be two different things, at KV I.i.203. Moreover, any set of aggregates would fail to capture the person unless it included not only every element that ever arises in this causal stream, but also somehow included just that cessation to which this stream led. The aggregates, and even the transition from one group and kind of aggregates to another, are the bases of the person; but they cannot exhaustively define the person.
What the Pudgalav!din sees -and his Buddhist opponent would rather ignore -is that mere proximity at a time, and mere causal connectedness over time are not sufficient to determine which are the correct and incorrect ways of grouping aggregates in our conceptualizations of 'many as one'. Neither is 'our convenience' the missing part of the explanation. It would be, at least sometimes (and perhaps generally), more convenient not to recognize certain causal connections as distinct, integrated and excluding all others -for many aggregates rightly excluded from some unity might well be causally connected to it in relevant ways. Moreover, appeal to 'our convenience' (or indeed, to 'relevance') presupposes purposes for which some, but not other ways of subdividing aggregates will be useful. But such aims can only arise and be articulated within conceptual reality. That is to say, having purposes at all presupposes subdivisions among generically similar causal connections which are supposedly only made based on the principle of convenience.
The Pudgalav!din recognizes and avoids this circularity by acknowledging that in one central case, our convenience does not determine but rather tracks the different ways in which aggregates are related -either as forming a unity, or as being collocated or causally connected without forming a unity. Taking certain collocations of elements to be a single thing is correct because they really do belong to each other in some way that they do not belong to the other elements. This, I suggest, is what it means to say that the Buddha, using his omniscience, "sees beings decreasing and being reborn", as the scriptures record, and yet the person is not itself a visible object like colour . According to Vasubandhu, this point is generalized across all sense modalities, as indeed it should be if 'perceiving the person' amounts to perceiving that certain elements or streams belong together. Vasubandhu presents the claim as a response to an epistemological objection, regarding how we come to know the person:
They must state by which of the six consciousnesses a person is known to exist. They say that a person is known to exist by all six. They explain how by saying that if a consciousness is aware of a person in dependence upon a visible form known to exist by means of the eye, it is said that a person is known to exist by means of the eye; but it is not said that the person is or is not the visible form.
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Vasubandhu criticizes this claim, insisting that either one perceives only the aggregates, in which case "the same account can be given of milk or other such [complex] things" -so the person is every bit as conceptual as, and no more ultimate than, every other complex phenomenon; or else one must see something distinct from them, which would make the person a visible phenomenon (or audible, etc.), and one separate from the rest of the visibles (audibles, etc.) constituting the basis on which we conceive the person. Even worse, Vasubandhu continues, since "each of the five organs encounters its own domain and objects. None encounters the domain and objects of another", if the Pudgalav!dins insist we might perceive the person equally with any of the sensemodalities, then the person must be both essentially visible and essentially audible and essentially tactile, and so on. And this is clearly incoherent.
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84 Siderits' account of the Abhidharma position actually acknowledges this need, in a footnote: "Where there are the right kinds of causal connections, it is conventionally true that punishment is deserved even when ultimately distinct skandhas are involved." (Buddhism as Philosophy, 67n16). Defending the ultra-minimalist account, Siderits would no doubt explain 'right kind' by reference to efficacy. But since we seek here 'whatever is the responsible agent', the only thing that could make these connections 'the right ones' is that those previous skandhas really are responsible, in some way others are not. 85 It simply happens that some sub-divisions of inter-connected dharmas are usefully grouped together, given our purposes. 86 AKB IX, §2.5 of Duerlinger's translation, as likewise the quotations in the remainder of the paragraph. 87 We might think that this would not be true of the consciousness 'sense-modality', and that it -like Plato's psyche in the Theaetetus -could be called in to access equally any of the modes of sensory input. Consciousness, however, on the Abhidharma account is not that sort of thing, for it too is just a skandha: a heap of distinct kinds of consciousnesses, eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, etc. Vasubandhu clarifies that the 'mind-organ' does not perceive objects, for it is incapable of grasping anything as an object. It is 'mental-consciousness' that grasps mental objects -but presumably, if the Pudgalav!dins adopt this But the Pudgalav!din's position here is not so incoherent as Vasubandhu makes it appear.
IV. FROM THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF PERSONS TO METAPHYSICS IV.i. Answering Vasubandhu
There are two towers on the hill, at some distance from each other. There is no question but that you come to know the towers by perception, and this perception is visual perception. You see the towers, and this is your access to them. Now, what about the space between them, or the fact that they are at some distance from each other?
Space, according to the Buddhists, is acausal, so the distance itself cannot give rise to the perception of distance. 88 But this knowledge or awareness also cannot be identical simply to awareness of either or both of the two towers. They are perceptions of towers, and as such do not themselves indicate anything about distance, which is not of course a tower. This question is simpler than, but structurally similar to the question of how we could come to know the pudgala, if the foregoing account of what the pudgala is meant to be is broadly correct. Perhaps, then, we should return to our initial inclination to say that we perceive the distance between the towers, and face head-on the question: What sort of perception is this? It is not a visual perception of the space itself, since that causes no perception whatsoever to arise; and explanation of (now merely apparent) cross-modal perception of the person, then they have granted the whole point, viz. that the person as such is prajñaptisat, conceptual. 88 This is the standard Buddhist account, but there were dissenters. The Kathavatthu records briefly a debate between the Therav!dins and Buddhists who argued for the ultimate reality and indeed the perceptibility of space (Kathavatthu VI.6-7). And according to Vasubandhu, the space between objects is an unconditioned but perceptible dharma (AKBh I.5, I.28). 89 According to Buddhaghosa, "In 'the interval between two trees,' here, the shape of the trees is seen with the eye, but as to the interval, there being no shape to it, it is space'; that which appears is an act of ideation, not of sense-cognition." (KVP-A VI.7). Collette Cox ('From Category to Ontology', 557-58) has a useful discussion of the treatment of the reality of space in the Mah!vib!&!, according to which space is acausal but can be known via prasa$ga-type arguments, and transcendental-type arguments.
it is not the same as the visual perception the two towers or of either one of them. In this case, however, one might say there is a positive perception of a grassy knoll, namely of precisely that grass knoll by which the towers are separated. 90 It is by this that one infers the distance between the towers.
This will not quite suffice -for now I perceive three things: two towers and a grassy knoll.
And if it is by inference from these perceptions that I should come to know the distance at which the towers stand, then similar issues of ordering and relatedness arise: Is it by perception or inference that I recognize the difference between the two towers, and that the grassy knoll is between, not beside them? Since there is nothing for such an inference to be based on -except a perception of the very fact -it seems here too we must appeal to perception.
This, I suggest, is the kind of issue the Pudgalav!dins are trying to raise about the person.
Just as, apparently, in seeing the two towers I thereby see they are at some distance from each other, so in perceiving some portion of perceptible person-constituting aggregates I therewith perceive the person. And since person-constituting aggregates belong to various kinds, then we might appeal to any sense modality in the same way as a route to come to know the person. It is not the distance between the aggregates, however, but their belonging together -belonging to each other -that one perceives through any perception of person-constituting aggregates. Thus the epistemological claim of how we come to know the pudgala crosses into metaphysical territory of what is there to be known.
IV.ii. Persons /v/ Non-Personal 'Wholes'
If this line of thought shows anything, there is a danger it may thereby have shown too much. For it looks now as if I perceive some whole -"two towers at some distance from each other" -every bit as ultimately real as the person. But the Pudgalav!dins do not actually want to say that in every composite perception some whole is perceived. There is supposed to be something special about the aggregates comprising the person. Now in the case of the towers on the hill, it looked like there might be an alternative account -what feels like perception is in fact a subtle inference, so that there need be no 'distance' as such perceived. Can this deflationary, inferential, account of perceiving the distance between the towers on the hill be made to work, after all? If so, does it work as well in the case of perceiving a person in the aggregates? If so, we may have lost one argument for supporting the pudgalav!da. If not, however, and if the inferential account does work for towers, then so much the better. We will have seen the kind of point the Pudgalav!dins want to make, without making that point apply 90 Or, according to Vasubandhu, it is light and darkness that is perceived, 'a certain type of colour' (AKBh I.28).
indiscriminately to everything.
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In the case of the towers on the hill, I might perceive a tower, perceive a grassy knoll, and perceive a tower; and then I have to put all these discrete moments of eye-consciousness together.
This would be the story of how I perceive that there are two towers at some distance from each other, without having to grant what seems like 'seeing the distance between the towers' or 'seeing that they are at a distance'. Now there must arise here a question of composition: If these are discrete moments of eye-consciousness, how are they to be put together? What ordering principles are there? How do I know the difference between two moments of eye-consciousness of the same tower, plus a moment of grassy-knoll-eye-consciousness, on the one hand; and an eyeconsciousness of a tower, one of a grassy knoll, and one of a second tower, on the other? (The tower-eye-consciousnesses only need be similar, not even identical, for this to be a problem.)
Instead of appealing directly to perception, we might instead recall that I never have just three moments of visual consciousness at my disposal. The mind should so order these three visual impressions at issue that they make most sense of the rest of the information available to me, so that I am able to function in the world and navigate my way round it. This would be something like the principle of convenience: when confronted with a manifold of simples, the mind so orders these as to be successful and efficient in action.
One might wonder whether this supposedly deflationary account can in fact dispense with assertions about reality genuinely being so ordered, and this order being fully real. But let us allow for the moment that it can, for there is another question more relevant to the intra-Buddhist dispute about the person: Supposing the inferential account succeeds for grassy knolls and towers, can it work just as well for persons and their aggregates? Or in that case is there yet something left unaccounted for?
There are, I think, two reasons why the inferential account given of how two towers can be known to be at a distance from one another will not work when we turn to explaining the perception of the person.
IV.ii.(a) What Is Perceived When There is a pudgala, and Otherwise Not?
The first reason is the absence of a suitable correlate to play the role of the 'grassy knoll' in 91 Priestley's first (and ultimately rejected) interpretation, and those of many other commentators who focus on the 'wholeness' and 'unity' factors of the pudgala, do not present views that enable us to make a principled distinction between the wholeness or unity of the pudgala, and that of other non-personal complex wholes, such as mountains, plants, and chariots (artefacts). See for instance the following description of the view ascribed to the Pudgalav!dins: "They maintain that it is 'true and ultimate' in the special sense that its existence and functions are not reducible to those of its constituents; its relation to the five aggregates is indeterminate because, although it is not reducible to them, neither is it independent of them." (Pudgalav!da Buddhism, 101) our tower example.
If I can just infer from seeing the grassy knoll that the towers stand at some distance from each other, this is on the basis of something I straightforwardly perceive: the grassy knoll. But in the case of the person, there is no such basis. Persons differ at least from the example given, if not from all complex unities, in having no possible basis for such an inference except the person itself.
This we must then come to know by perception. The explanation unnecessary for towers on hills is unavoidable in the case of persons: Through perceiving the aggregates, any subset of them, through any modality, we perceive by that same sense-modality that just these aggregates belong together. And I am able to do this because there is really something there to perceive -namely, their belonging together, or to one another; that is, the person.
What is this 'belonging together'? What does one perceive in perceiving the aggregates that makes it correct to judge 'this is a person'? It cannot simply be the recognition that these aggregates exist in close spacio-temporal proximity, for this is generally true of all aggregates that are merely imputed to be wholes; in fact it is also, as we saw above, true of elements both within and outwith the set of elements rightly judged to be constitutive of a particular person. We perceive 'these belong to each other' only in some special cases. One plausible way of describing what is special about these cases is that they involve the sort of groupings at a time and over time that are marked by new functionality, and by development.
Thich Thiên Châu cites an analogy drawn between the person and an eye:
Just as, through a reunion of the four great elements (caturmah!bh"tasa'yoga) there is a dharma 'eye' (cak&us), so, through the reunion of the five aggregates (pañcaskandhasa'yoga), there is a dharma 'individual' (pudgala).
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Functional unity certainly is something special about persons. Because they are just this sort of bundle of matter, conception and intention, they can do particular kinds of things, like commit murder (something with specific karmic consequences), rather than just disturb other agglomerations of elements in various ways.
But if the self were absolutely non-existent, then there could not be the killing of beings nor the killer would have anything killed. There would be nothing like theft and robbery, heresy and lewdness, telling lies and drinking wine… good and bad would yield neither freedom nor bondage; even bondage would have no one bound. There would be neither the 92 Cha( u, Literature of the Personalists, 159. The passage comes from the Mah!prajñ!p!ramit!%!stra, Vol. I, p. 43. The passage goes on to say that, according to the V!ts"putryas, "the pudgala is a fifth category, an ineffable (avaktavya) dharma, contained in the basket of texts (pi0aka)"; presumably, the eye does not also belong to this fifth category, so the analogy must be only a suggestion of a direction of thought than a very close similarity.
doer nor the deed nor any result thereof. Priestley, Pudgalav!da Buddhism, 96. 95 I think in general not enough attention has been paid to the fact that it is only the pudgala that is supposed to be ultimately real -not just any functional unity; our explanations of why the Pudgalav!dins held the view must therefore recognize some difference between these sorts of unities, otherwise their arguments for persons turn out to be arguments for holism in general, which is certainly not a position they would endorse. 96 The Vijñ!nak!ya contains a longer treatment of such 'developments', in the fourth section of the second chapter, as translated by Watanabe (Philosophy and Its Development in the Nik!yas and Abhidhamma, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983) 187-189. such as chariots. 97 When we speak of a girl becoming a woman, the very notion of development picks out an internal coherence through change, independently specifiable and indeed only making sense as development by reference to the previous stages.
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In contrast to the case of the chariot, it is precisely by disregarding considerations of usefulness, and looking only at the different parts and their relations at different times, that we can make sense of the notion of development, and growth. 99 The different stages in the succession and the different elements at a time have a coherence that cannot be explained in the same way as the unity of chariot parts over time -as our convenience, our aims, and our mental activity simplifying the manifold disparate elements and their conjunctions. What we acknowledge in the very conceiving of 'becoming a grammarian' or 'growing into a woman' is the fact that certain elements really belong only to each other, and that it is only in recognition of this that we conceive of the girl growing into a woman in the first place. On my hypothesis that the pudgala amounts to the fact of certain elements really belonging only to each other, the claim is that this 'belonging to' is basicultimately true, and not explicable in any other terms, or by reference to anything else.
We may now have a criterion, or joint pair of criteria, for distinguishing which bundles imply persons. And we have thereby the beginnings of an explanation why there must be ultimately true persons for any person-constituting aggregates, but not of all bundles. In the first place, person-constituting bundles have emergent functionality -can do now things only when they and their activities are taken as wholes. Secondly, and relatedly, this new functionality is not one that answers to our needs, but one to which we are responsive. This emerges from a consideration of the very notion of 'development' or growth, which is conceivable precisely because it is perceived to be there -and not because we have a standing interest in the end-product. These joint criteria are satisfied only in the case of living beings.
I think we can make the line of thought more precise, and more compelling, by considering just what is special about the acquired characteristics belonging only to whole person-constituting bundles -our example of 'new functionality' already gave us a hint of this. We can do this by returning to the towers on the hill. I said above that there are two divergences between the towercase and the person-case, and looking at the second now might help to clarify what is distinctive of aggregations which are, by their inter-relations, persons.
97 "man is something different from a chariot", Cha ( u reminds us (146) . 98 Reinforcing the impression that a special kind of continuity is at issue, is KV I.i.183-88, where each moment of consciousness, of seeing, etc. has person, but not each new moment is a new person. Milindapañha 40 attempts to account for such notions by way of dependence; but since any given state of affairs arises in dependence on a wide variety of conditions, this cannot pick out the developmental trajectory. There must be some implicit recognition of some 'special kind' of dependence relating posterior to prior states. 99 What Aristotle recognized must be an 'internal principle of change', only more minimally construed.
IV.ii.(b) Persons as Sources of Unity
The second disanalogy between the tower-on-the-hill and the aggregates-and-their-person cuts deeper than the first. The 'inference' explanation as described above was crucially incomplete.
For without acknowledgement, it relied on the unity of the cognizer to provide coherence to the sense impressions. In a way, this is no more than what the standard Abhidharma account grantsminds supply the perception of unity when confronted with what is in fact a manifold. But what such an account overlooks is that a unified cognizer is thereby smuggled in.
If the preferred Abhidharma account of causal succession of moments of consciousness with no real fact about inter-relatedness were true, then, the Pudgalav!din claims, "the Buddha could not be omniscient, because a mind with its mental factors is momentary, it cannot know all things.
But a person may know all things". 100 But forget knowing all things -even knowing those two towers on the hill are standing at some distance from each other would be impossible. In our earlier story, we generously allowed a mind that 'so orders the manifold' as to make most sense, or be most convenient and coherent. 101 The principle of convenience is thus allowed its due. But, whether in a single complex case or in the vastly complex case of omniscience, such cognitions require that there be some kind of unity in discerning the manifold together to determine which groupings will be convenient and coherent. This source of unity might be an extra element, as a Brahmanical soul or, more minimally, as a Kantian agent; or it might be that we could give a still more minimal account and simply say that the fact of the making-coherent, the fact of mental organization is basic. It is a bare, brute -but inescapable -fact of the matter that certain groups of cognitions display a categorically different sort of integrity from the run-of-the-mill causal connectedness between aggregates in general. The complex cognition is possible because the perception -and consciousness-dharmas here just are related to one another in a distinctive way -in a personconstituting way. 102 This is the most minimal explanation possible, and I suggest is the one the Pudgalav!dins are insisting must be accepted as the only way to do justice to the phenomena without adopting a substantialist theory of self. 103 Unfortunately admitting the ultimate reality of complex facts, rather than simple substances -of relations whose character is determined and indeed constituted by their relata -is not expressible within the framework of Buddhist metaphysics -and comes to be positively rejected.
104 100 Duerlinger translation §3.1 101 )r"dhara later makes this by his time rather familiar point. 102 The alternative of course is to drop the inference-account of complex cognition in all cases in favour of the perception-account -but this would only have the unfortunate consequence of making all complex wholes (and even complex states of affairs) really, ultimately there to be perceived and not merely imputed by the cognizer. 103 It might be worth asking why the Kantian view would not be accepted -was it not conceived of? Or is it rather that it shows up in the current metaphysical framework as simply a variant of the substantial self? 104 See Dharmak"rti, On Relations, where the primary objections rely implicitly on the presumption that
The second 'disanalogy' between our two cases thus shows that what is special about persons is that they are unity-conferring in virtue of being organized in special ways distinguishing them from other sorts of continua. This is the distinctive emergent functionality which cannot be explained by appeal to convenience, because it grounds the very possibility of any such appeal.
There are not 'stream-individuators' for all complex phenomena because persons are the individuators for all other continua, through the sort of activity that constitutes them as the distinctive sort of unity they are. Moreover, the 'new functionality' specific to persons is not just that they grow and reproduce -plants do that; 105 it is rather that their growing and their emergent functioning indicate a unity between a variety of different sorts of elements, specifically including perceptual elements and cognitions, as well as desires -and only thereby are they able to be sources of the sorts of cognitions in virtue of which prajñaptisat, conceptual reality, can arise. And only then can karma, and the specific responsibility that comes from realized intentions, arise.
V. KARMA & DEVELOPMENT
We saw that the texts suggest that person-constituting bundles are distinct in kind because of (1) their growth or development -a sort of development in which the end is not given by any interests or desires of ours; and (2) their emergent functionality. The emergent functionality of particular interest is the ability to conceive of aggregates as unities, the experience of 'many' as 'one'. 106 It is from this that the distinctively person-related functions emerge, most centrally action.
For karma is not just any knocking together of discrete substances. Only a certain subset of such interactions qualify as that peculiar phenomenon 'action'. Having its source in the unity-conferring configuration of intentions, perceptions, consciousnesses… that is a person, enables action to have moral and not just material characteristics, which therefore attract moral and not just material consequences.
We can see this confirmed if we return to the three bases of designation of the person -the aggregates, transmigration and cessation. In the Sa'mit#yanik!ya%!stra, considering especially the designation of the person based on transmigration, we see that what most frequently emerges as the point of concern is not the theoretical question about whether the person reborn is the same anything really existing must be a substance. 105 If plants don't pose a problem (and there is no evidence that they did) then this means it is not organic unity that is at issue, any more than structure/function: it is karmic (i.e. specifically mind-body, thoughtaction) unity. 106 This might be an alternative explanation of the close connection Priestly explores between conceptual reality and the pudgala.
of elements gives rise to the distinctive order of succession singled out and designated karma. In fact, we might think of karma as the name for the patterns by which different types of dharma, each with their own logic of succession internal to their kind, are organized with respect to one another.
So in the Kath!vatthu we see that we cannot say that the maker of karma is distinct from karma made (I.i.214), since the person just is the fact that these aggregates so belong to each other as to constitute morally inflected actions and results. Likewise, the fruit and experiencer thereof cannot be said to be two different things (Kath!vatthu I.i.203) . Only because these aggregates do belong together can this later event be the 'fruit' of an earlier event.
CONCLUSION:
We have highlighted now two ways in which the collection of elements constituting persons differ from those constituting non-personal complex unities. In the first place, persons develop over time, and do not just change; and they do not develop for the purpose of creating a previously desired and conceived of functionality (as happens when a chariot is built). Rather, it is because this order of changes really belongs together in a distinctive way that we are able to conceive of the organism as growing. In the second place, persons are not plants. It may be that all organisms develop; but that anything can be conceived of as developing, or any complexity conceived as such at all, requires the real unity of complex persons. That is to say, the very possibility of conceptual reality -and also of the categorically complex phenomena constitutive of karma and its links to its appropriate fruit -rests on the real reality of just those interactions of matter, intention, perception, cognition and consciousness rightly perceived as belonging to each other, and not to other elements.
The pudgala is, on this view, the mutual-relatedness of diverse kinds of elements at a time and over time. And it is just that belonging together which constitutes the possibility for moral agency, development, and unifying conceptualized reality. The capacities to serve as a moral agent and to develop are not reducible to the aggregates themselves, for all these presuppose the reality of some but not other elements' belonging together. None of this, note, implies the existence of an immaterial substantial substratum for the aggregates.
The non-categorial metaphysics to which the Buddhists were committed, however, prevented there being any intelligible way of expressing this position. The pudgala, taken as a unique sort of fact about belonging-together, was sui generis -a fifth kind, as they maintained. But it is the nature of this kind of thing not to be separable from its constitutive elements, and to gain its specific character through the history of those constitutive elements. It is thus no substance, no it may not necessarily have to do with dualistic concerns about the integration of mind and matter, but rather with the integration of the five main sorts of dharmas more generally.
